Appellate Case No. B289328
In this unpublished appellate opinion, the Court of Appeal reversed a SLAPP Motion granted at the trial level.
This case is another in a line of SLAPP cases dealing with super vague Complaints, where a SLAPP moving defendant essentially tries to pigeonhole the plaintiff’s super vague allegations within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute by and through the SLAPP motion itself. Per this Court and several prior appellate cases, this is generally not allowed.
Facts
Plaintiff is a musician, part of the rock band Pretty Boy Floyd. Plaintiff sued the owner of Demon Doll Records, Inc. for trade libel and intentional interference with actual economic relations.
Plaintiff alleged that in 2017, Defendant falsely advised representatives of another record company – Frontiers Records – apparently that that Plaintiff was a convicted felon with a rap sheet for extortion and gun violence against his own artists. The Court noted that the Complaint allegations were very vague, so vague that they would not withstand a demurrer.
The only specific part of the Complaint allegations was the allegation that Defendant made the defamatory falsehoods to “representatives of Frontiers Records.”
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant made these falsehoods about Plaintiff in 2017 after Plaintiff reached out to Defendant that same year with a cease and desist demand, demanding that Defendant stop selling some of Plaintiff’s other copyrighted records through Demon Doll without Plaintiff’s permission.
Procedural Posture
Defendant filed an anti-SLAPP motion. In the Motion, Defendant apparently argued that his speech was protected by the SLAPP statute and presented evidence of the “truth” of the alleged speech. The opinion is unclear as to the particulars of the defense presentation.
Critical, however, was the fact that Defendant did not present argument or evidence relating to his speech at issue in Plaintiff’s Complaint. Instead, Defendant presented evidence and argument relating to similar speech he made about Plaintiff three years prior in 2014, not to Frontier Records but instead to a rock music website Metal Sludge. As the Court of Appeal noted, “neither defendant’s motion, nor his declaration, identified any communications that defendant had with representatives of Frontiers Records in or after June 2017,” presumably because Defendant did not want to concede liability to Plaintiff on the claims at issue in this case.
“Plaintiff did not file an opposition to the special motion to strike.” Per a footnote in the opinion, Plaintiff later argued via ex parte application that he was “misled about an agreement with opposing counsel to continue the hearing so that plaintiff could file an opposition.”
Analysis
Because the Motion was unopposed, the trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, even though the motion centered on actions and speech that were not at issue in this case. The Court of Appeal did note that the Complaint allegations were “somewhat vague” but that they “were specific in one key respect – they identified the party to whom the statements were made” – Frontiers Records, not Metal Sludge.
Here, the Court of Appeal set forth some general parameters on how to analyze a vague Complaint and/or one that contains broad allegations but also a disclaimer that certain protected actions are not being targeted therein.
This Court cited to Central Valley Hospitalists v. Dignity Health (2018) 19 Cal.App.4th 203, 217-218 for the general rule that if a “complaint contain[s] broad allegations but specifically disclaim[s] being based on a type of protected activity, defendant c[a]n not satisfy [the] first prong of the anti-SLAPP statute by arguing the complaint must, in fact, be based on the disclaimed protected activity.”
The Court further cited to Martin v. Inland Empire Utilities Agency (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 611 for the general proposition that when a complaint is so vague that it is subject to demurrer, “a defendant cannot simply redraft the complaint to force the allegations within the confines of protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute.”
The same general rule was proposed in Medical Marijuana, Inc. v. ProjectCBD.com (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 602, 621: “It is not our role to engage in what would amount to a redrafting of the first amended complaint in order to read that document as alleging conduct that supports a claim that has not in fact been specifically alleged, and then assess whether the pleading that we have essentially drafted could survive the anti-SLAPP motion directed at it.”
Here, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s SLAPP ruling (granting the motion), holding that the moving defendant failed to meet its first prong burden by failing to present argument and evidence relating to the alleged speech at issue in the Complaint, i.e. the speech to Frontiers Records. The Court separately noted in a footnote that in other parts of the lower court record, Plaintiff presented written evidence substantiating his claims of trade libel and intentional interference in the form of an email from defendant all but conceding liability.
The take-away here is that as a defendant, you can’t immediately file an anti-SLAPP motion if the Complaint allegations are super vague, even if you “know” or are fairly certain that your SLAPP-protected actions are being targeted by the Complaint. Depending on the circumstances, you can try to force the issue via SLAPP motion – particularly if the only speech that exists is SLAPP protected – but that will be an uphill battle under the above-referenced line of cases.
Instead of filing an anti-SLAPP motion, a defendant facing a super vague Complaint must press the issue via Demurrer and/or discovery (ideally both). Defense can ask the Court to hear the anti-SLAPP on a late-filed basis in its discretion, based on the foregoing circumstances, especially if the trial court overrules the Demurrer and tells the parties to “work out the details in discovery.”
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